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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT APPLIES TO 
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL TRANSACTIONS. 
Appellee argues that the Utah Consume* Sales Practices Act 
should not be applied to the landlord/tenarit context. In support 
of this view, he asserts that the recent aqoption by the Utah 
Legislature of the Fit Premises Act in residential rental 
transactions impliedly excludes application of Utah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act to a residential rental transaction. In 
support of the proposition, Appellee cites a Washington case, 
State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1985). 
In Schwab, the Attorney General of the State of Washington 
brought suit against a landlord arguing thajt violations of 
Washington's Residential Landlord/Tenant Act were per se 
deceptive and unfair acts in violation of Washington's Consumer 
Protection Act. According to the majority $.n Schwab, the 
statutory scheme behind Washington's Consumer Protection Act is 
an inclusive one, in which the Legislature £cts to specifically 
1 
bring suppliers or transactions within the ambit of the Act if 
the Legislature intends coverage. Schwab, at pages 110-111. 
This factor alone distinguishes the Schwab case. A "specific 
inclusion" statutory scheme is not the approach of the FTC Act, 
the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, nor of Utah's Consumer 
Sales Practices Act, modeled on both. All of these statutes were 
premised upon a more flexible, "specific exclusion" format in 
which broad, general application is restricted only by 
legislative exclusion. 
The relevance of the "specific legislative expression" which 
the Schwab Court demanded is quite different under the two 
statutory schemes. As a "specific inclusion" statute, the 
Washington statute requires specific legislative expression to 
find that the transaction or supplier is within the scope of the 
Act. Conversely, Utah's "specific exclusion" format requires 
specific legislative expression only if a transaction or supplier 
is to be excluded from coverage. While proof of "intent to 
include" was thus important to the Schwab court, the difference 
in the Utah statute makes expressions of specific inclusive 
intent unnecessary. The Schwab decision is thus fundamentally 
inapposite. 
The dissent of Justice Dore in Schwab 
, 693 P.2d at 114, is the more persuasive position. His opinion 
carefully reviews the authorities and the policy considerations 
supporting an expansive application of consumer protection 
statutes which apply them i_n pari materia with progressive 
2 
landlord/tenant statutes. 
The Appellee argues that the recent adoption of the Utah Fit 
Premises Act makes the broad protections afforded to consumers 
under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act unnecessary. This is 
far from the case. While the warranty of habitability 
legislation is a step forward in creation c^f just remedies for 
tenants, it does not in any way cover the field of protection for 
consumers against deceptive and unconscionable acts as 
contemplated by the legislature in the adoption of the Utah 
Consumers Sales Practices Act. Consumer protection for tenants 
of residential property is still vitally needed to provide a 
remedy for deceptive and unconscionable practices of landlords, 
complementing the Fit Premises Act. 
POINT II, 
THE SUPREME COURT IS FREE TO REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CORRECTNESS. 
Appellee argues that the clearly erroneous standard should 
be applied to the issues presented on appeal. The issues 
presented by this appeal are all questions of law relating to the 
application of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act to the facts 
found by the trial court.1 This Court has consistently held that 
in reviewing the trial court's alleged erroneous conclusions of 
law, it affords them no particular deference but reviews them for 
correctness. Creer v. Valley Bank and Trust Co., 770 P.2d 113, 
1
 Utah Code Annotated § 13-11-5(2 )j 
unconscionability of an act or practice is 
the court. 
provides that the 
a question of law for 
3 
114 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985)• This is therefore free to review the trial court's 
Conclusions of Law for correctness. 
POINT III, 
THE NEW FIT PREMISES ACT IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE. 
Landlord argues that if the Utah Fit Premises Act had been 
effective at the time of the acts complained of by tenant she 
would not have been in compliance with the Act. 
The landlord ejected the tenant from the premises by utilizing a 
condemnation order with no notice whatsoever. The Fit Premises 
Act provides, at Utah Code Annotated § 57-22-5(4)(b): 
No renter may be required to move sooner than 
ten days after the date of notice. 
Thus, if the Fit Premises Act had been in effect, the landlord 
would have violated the law as well. This argument is 
irrelevant, however, since the Fit Premises Act was not the law 
at the time this case arose. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act does not apply to 
landlord/tenant relations. Appellee's arguments regarding the 
implications of Schwab are misguided given the differences 
4 
between Utah and Washington statutes. The recent passage of the 
Utah Fit Premises Act is irrelevant to the resolution of this 
case. 
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